When the tectonic plates of science shifted from an Aristotelian to a primarily Newtonian paradigm, a powerful chain reaction was irreversibly set into motion. The subsequent ripples of implications are still being felt more than 280 years later, and worked out within philosophy, science and ethics. The aim of this paper is threefold. First, much of the current language employed in discussion of nature conservation ethics contains an inconsistent hybrid of the two respective Aristotelian and Newtonian systems. Next, even a strictly Aristotelian view of ecological ethics is internally inconsistent. Lastly, environmental ethics should be primarily shaped, understood, and articulated from an unabashedly anthropocentric position.
One of the most important innovations of Newton was to dispense with the fundamental cause of telos to explain phenomena in the material world. This move radically banished any presuppositions professing to claim the intended or predetermined state or function of natural physical elements. From this position explanatory mechanisms can be postulated, put forth, and tested against reliable recorded data. Thus, the pursuit of legitimate science was born. However still to this day there are some people within the scientific community that attempt to superimpose a teleological vision onto a mechanized understanding of ecology. Dr. James Lovelock put forth the Gaia hypothesis as a way to understand our ecological environment. He defines it as, “a complex entity involving the Earth's biosphere, atmosphere, oceans, and soil; the totality constituting a feedback or cybernetic system which seeks an optimal physical and chemical environment for life on this planet.” (Lovelock 10) The last part of this statement is crucial as it attributes agency to the entire ecological system as a whole. It further asserts that, as a self organizing system, the ecological system has a seemingly altruistic or benevolent propensity towards a preferred state of affairs. This has the unmistakable ring of what Aristotle called eudaimonia. In his book, The Extended Phenotype Dr. Richard Dawkins persuasively points out that this theory requires the implausible belief that, from the most basic of individual to elaborately complex, organisms can act in concert with prodigious foresight and planning (Dawkins). Also contained within the rhetoric of environmental ethics is a position of assumed monolithic integrity or equilibrium within nature as a whole. Dr. Holmes Rolston puts it this way:
“When humans gain a description of how ecosystems work, Leopold believes that a prescription arises to respect the beauty, integrity, and stability of such systems. That is not all of ethics, only an extension of it. Duties to other humans remain all they have ever been, but ‘the land’ now counts too. Duties to humans (feeding the starving) that conflict with duties to ecosystems (preserving tropical forests) remain a quite unfinished agenda.” (Rolston 182)
This position, however, is palpably problematic, and therefore dangerous, given that Dr. Slavoj Zizek convincingly points out that nature, far from being static or harmonious, is in reality a series of violent reactions or catastrophes from which homo sapiens are often the beneficiaries. Case in point would be the exploitation and benefit from fossil fuels (Zizek).
Even within a purely Aristotelian view, undoubtedly the most disturbing notion of all arising from this so-called deep ecology is that, as Dr. Arne Naess puts it, “All life has intrinsic value, irrespective of its value to humans.” (Harding 51) This statement as an ethic fails to meet any sort of applicability requirement for the several reasons. First, it fails to offer any non-arbitrary criteria to differentiate what state of affairs are preferable, but also any sort of life hierarchy informing those subsequent decisions. For example, if all of life is equally intrinsically valuable, then there is no framework giving a predator any more right to live than its respective prey. Another way to frame it is to draw the analogy between a smaller component of a larger living system, such as a kidney or eye is to a body. In this system no deference is even given to sentient over non-sentient life. Dr. Janna Thompson succinctly put it this way: “How we divide up the world depends upon context and convenience. But surely an environmental ethic which claims to discover intrinsic value in nature shouldn’t depend upon the way we happen to look at things.” (Thompson 147) In short, it dismally fails the litmus test principle of nonvacuous contrast.
In light of these blatant contradictions and inconsistencies, nature conservation ethics should be articulated from a clearly anthropocentric position in strong divergence from and opposition to biospheric egalitarianism. This is not a radically irresponsible position of après mois le déluge; but rather is profoundly consistent with an appropriately Darwinian survival of the fittest understanding. Ecologies are dynamic systems constantly in flux with no inherently preferred state containing intrinsic value. They should be undauntedly cultivated toward states with the greatest and most sustainable extrinsic benefits for homo sapiens. This position is more honest and consistent in providing an ethical framework for informing and motivating decisions aimed at ensuring and enriching the continued existence of our own race as homo sapiens. Under this framework, even aesthetic and emotional benefits would be admissible motivators for maintaining or changing the environment in view of their necessarily extrinsic advantages. This position, unlike deep ecology, does not claim to have access to any sort of objective position (void of prejudice) from which to evaluate the inherent value of all of life in its various forms. This position could predictably be derogatorily described as human chauvinism, to which the appropriate response is of course it is. Claiming to have any other set of motivations of an objectively altruistic nature, is not merely blatantly false but palpably dishonest. Furthermore, this position lacks the false dichotomy of viewing humans as somehow distinct from nature, but instead sees them as a deeply integral part fighting for continued survival like any other species or organism. Essentially, the deep ecology movement is best described not as a valid scientific theory, but as an ideology or dogmatic religion. This position brings with it an entire set of assumed and often times unarticulated metaphysical presuppositions. As such it should properly be criticized as beyond the scope of legitimate scientific discourse which concerns itself with empirically verifiable hypothesis.
In conclusion, as with any scientific revolution, previously viable positions are often incalcitrant and tend to linger past their relevancy. A teleological cause is no longer needed to explain natural phenomena, and has become a troubling impediment to the continued progress of understanding. The continued illegitimate mixing of the mutually antithetical Newtonian and Aristotelian systems falls short of being consistent or helpful in discussing and discovering a proper method with which to approach the increasingly important subject of nature conservation ethics. The solution is not to regress to a purely teleological ethical framework because it is deeply inconsistent and fails to pass the non-vacuity requirement. Instead, the way forward must be to fully embrace the new paradigm and allow it to structure and inform an unashamedly anthropocentrically motivated framework with which to guide ecological conservation efforts and decisions.
Works Cited
Holmes, III. Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the Natural World. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1989.
Taylor, Paul. Respect for Nature. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1986.
Dawkins, Richard. The Extended Phenotype. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1999.
Taylor, Astra, et al. Examined Life: Philosophy Is In the Street. Educational ed. [New York, N.Y.]: Distributed by Zeitgeist Films, 2009.
Thompson, Janna. 1990. 'A Refutation of Environmental Ethics', Environmental Ethics 12: 147-160.
Lovelock, James. Gaia. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 2000.
Harding, Stephan and Lynn Margulis. Animate Earth. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 2006.
