postmodernquestions

Philosophical Attacks

 

    In the effort to do philosophy, one must be willing to examine and subsequently dismiss tacit assumptions and unarticulated presuppositions. In short, one must not cling to ordinary ways of thinking simply because they are familiar. Sir David Ross undoubtedly made significant and lasting contributions to the philosophy of ethics. However, in his attempt to defeat the theory of Utilitarianism, his attachment to the familiar unavoidably bleeds through. Therefore, it is the contention of this paper that his attack on what he deems as ‘Ideal Utilitarianism’ ultimately falls short. 

 

    The best definition of Ideal Utilitarianism, according to Ross, is provided by Professor Moore. “What makes actions right is that they are productive of more good than could have been produced by any other action open to the agent.”[1] (pg.16) Ross states his primary objection in the following manner: 

“The essential defect of the 'ideal utilitarian* theory is that it ignores, or at least does not do full justice to, the highly personal character of duty. If the only duty is to produce the maximum of good, the question who is to have the good—• whether it is myself, or my benefactor, or a person to whom I have made a promise to confer that good on him, or a mere fellow man to whom I stand in no such special relation— should make no difference to my having a duty to produce that good. But we are all in fact sure that it makes a vast difference.” [1] (pg. 22) 

The problem, however, is that the only justification provided here is the unsupported assertion, “we are all in fact sure that it makes a vast difference.” This is a clear example of the logical fallacy known as Argumentum ad populum. It matters not that all believe two plus two equals four. In a proof, one is required to demonstrate logically why the conclusion naturally follows from the premises. Further, it should be pointed out that the theory of utilitarianism is primarily prescriptive in nature. In other words, it is not seeking to describe how most people normally go about navigating ethical decisions. Instead, it seeks to establish a system to determine or define what it means to call an act right or wrong. It therefore does no good for Ross to criticize Ideal Utilitarianism on the basis that it does not correspond to the way in which most people think about the process of making ethical decisions. 

 

    Ross seems to be particularly interested in the ethics involved in the complexities of human relations. He stresses the importance of these relationships so much so that he makes the following charge: 

“In fact the theory of ideal utilitarianism*...seems to simplify unduly our relations to our fellows. It says, in effect, that the only morally significant relation in which my neighbors stand to me is that of being possible beneficiaries by my action.” [1] (pg. 19) 

This charge however is guilty of attacking a straw man. An adherent to the theory of Utilitarianism would be entirely consistent in responding that these relationships are of course morally significant insofar as they enter into determining what action available to the agent would bring about the greatest amount of good. One could even go so far as to say that these relationships, far from being reduced to irrelevancy, are in point of fact part of the basis from which an agent goes about ascertaining how to produce the greatest good. 

 

    A further problem with Ross’s argument is that he leaves open too much room for equivocation concerning what exactly he means by Ideal Utilitarianism. One cannot but help to ask whether he is referring to Act or Rule Utilitarianism. Consider the following quote: 

“it must be maintained that there is a difference between prima facie duty and actual or absolute duty. When we think ourselves justified in breaking, and indeed morally obliged to break, a promise in order to relieve some one's distress, we do not for a moment cease to recognize a prima facie duty to keep our promise, and this leads us to feel, not indeed shame or repentance, but certainly compunction, for behaving as we do.” [1] (pg. 28) 

From this alone one could be led to believe that Ross is secretly an Act Utilitarian; these prima facie duties could be viewed as rules. Thus when they conflict and an agent must choose between them, it is natural to feel compunction for violating one of them. However an Act Utilitarian would ultimately refer to the first principle in such cases of secondary conflict. This confusion is not without merit especially considering what Ross states concerning the duty to produce the good. 

“besides the three (comparatively) simple goods, virtue, knowledge, and pleasure, there is a more complex good, not reducible to these, consisting in the proportionment of happiness to virtue. The bringing of this about is a duty which we owe to all men alike...This, therefore, with beneficence and self-improvement, comes under the general principle that we should produce as much good as possible.” [1] (pg. 27) 

It is unlikely that a utilitarian would necessarily object per se, to the assertion that the greatest good is complex and irreducible to any one simple good. If Ross wishes to attack Ideal Utilitarianism it requires him to somehow rebut the idea that the right action is the one which produces the greatest amount of good in the world. 

 

    While there may indeed be legitimate grounds for concern regarding the theory of Ideal Utilitarianism, the arguments presented by Ross fail to convince the skeptical mind. One must not resort to sophistry when endeavoring to conduct proper philosophical examination. This in no way invalidates the many excellent ideas raised by the venerable Sir David Ross. As previously stated, “The Right And The Good” has made what have proven to be significant and lasting contributions to ongoing ethical dialogues. 

Bibliography

1. Ross, D., The Right and The Good ed. P. Stratton-Lake1877: Oxford University Press.

 

The Pursuit of Knowing and Being Known

    When contemplating and discussing the intricately complex philosophical branch of epistemology, one can easily become overwhelmed. It is laden with myriads of apparent contradictions and insoluble paradoxes. Oftentimes, to borrow a cliché, it is far too easy to become lost in the trees losing sight of the forest. It is the contention of this paper that with the aide of Saint Augustine and Søren Kierkegaard, epistemological investigation can be reframed in such a way that avoids many of the errors inherent in the modern project. This paper will further evaluate the strengths and respective weaknesses of these two thinkers’ epistemology. Hopefully by the end of this paper the quest towards properly framing the enterprise of epistemology will be less obscure.

    Much of the business of philosophy is occupied with properly defining the question. Without this first step, an infinite production of useless answers will be generated in response to the question that was never asked in the first place. This is where Saint Augustine’s brilliance is to be located within the De magistro. Here the question is explicitly framed in terms of knowing as an inherently private affair consisting of inner episodes of awareness. This is contradistinguished from the Wittgenstein picture of knowing as a process of rule-governed behavior, accompanied by the understanding of those rules being intrinsically public. The danger of abstractions is that they tend to quickly lead to meaningless obscurity divorced from concrete examples. In that vein consider the following borrowed example:

“You rehearse to yourself the steps of a mathematical proof in an effort to understand it, but not yet grasping it: you’re merely parroting the proof. While thinking it through, however, you suddenly have a flash of insight and see how the proof works—you understand it and thereby recognize its truth.”

This example perfectly highlights the familiar phenomenological process that St. Augustine refers to as “illumination.” The denial of the significance of this moment is the Achilles heel to much of the modern epistemological approach. It seems to confirm what is instinctively known to be the case, which is that the act of knowing is an inescapably inner undertaking.

    Without overly rehashing and restating the arguments, a certain amount of review seems to be in order. Much of the De magistro is devoted to successfully refuting what is commonly referred to as the ‘information-transference account’ (hereafter referred to as ITA). In quickly summarizing, this is due to the fact that the language or sign exit transition is never truly accomplished. Instead it seems that signs are indomitably circular in a paradigmatic sense. It should be made clear what St. Augustine is not asking, namely, the nature of the relationship between knowledge and the physical world vis-à-vis sensory data. Rather, he is interested in the sort of platonic knowledge of the eternal forms. More specifically the human ability of teaching or knowledge transference is what is being properly put under the proverbial microscope. St. Augustine rightfully concludes that insofar as humans can teach, it seems to be a sort of Socratic prompting through the pointing out of signs. This however thus far leaves one at the same problem dealt with by Plato in The Meno. For various reasons St. Augustine rejects the solution of recollection. Instead he offers a uniquely Christian positive solution.

    Saint Augustine is at his strongest when properly delineating the problem at hand. However, when the mode is switched from the razor sharp deconstruction of inadequate answers to the positive construction of explanatory responses, clarity suffers. Essentially, the reader is asked to accept the idea that by virtue of mere antecedent belief in the ontological existence of a supremely benevolent divine being, humankind is endowed with access to the eternal Truth. Supposedly this god has instilled within all of mankind the internal light which renders St. Augustine’s theory of signs to be a valid epistemological approach. The obvious problem with this solution is that it is exclusively available to those who already hold that belief antecedent to reason in order to justify the reasonableness of any and all truth claims. It would seem that any epistemological approach purportedly defending the supremacy of reason should not use unsubstantiated belief as an integral, primal ingredient. Furthermore, the criticism could be fairly pointed out that this is a solution that works all too well. Whenever one encounters a difficult problem, one can simply invoke the existence of god as a way to effortlessly fill in the gaps. This response tends to have the effect of terminating further investigation due to the fact that nearly anything can be simply explained away via asserting the role of the divine.

    In turning to Søren Kierkegaard, it should be stated at the outset that, due to the intentional fragmentary nature of his writing, any explication and subsequent explanation of his work is consummately suspect. The consistent theme across his writing is a virulent reaction to the modern project perfectly personified in Hegel. Within this umbrella certain relationships are defined and explored as central to his attack on the so called “system.” The first is the fascinating hierarchical reversal of the relationship between the objective and subjective ways of knowledge. Seemingly implicit within for laymen and within philosophical discussions of knowledge the objective way is generally regarded as inherently superior. Kierkegaard however claims that this is ill-conceived. This interchange begins with an examination of what exactly objective knowledge consists of. Abstractions from the subjective experience are the raw material from which the objective is composed. The more one abstracts, the more objective one becomes. However, the more one abstracts, the further one becomes from the centrality of the phenomenological experience that is the locus and reality of the human experience. This process inevitably renders the subject as accidental. The objective way is, by very definition, coldly and irreconcilably indifferent to the subject. In contrast to many of his contemporaries, Kierkegaard is interested in a radically different epistemological relationship. Much of the present philosophical work being conducted around him was preoccupied with the relationship between knowledge and the object of that knowledge. Kierkegaard however seeks to examine the relationship between knowledge and the actual knower. This inquiry has the possibility of crumbling the perceived possibility of being able to cognitively separate oneself from the question of god’s existence. The following quote summarizes and elaborates on this point in the Great Dane’s own words:

“All essential knowledge relates to existence, or only such knowledge as has an essential relationship to existence is essential knowledge. All knowledge which does not inwardly relate itself to existence in the reflection of inwardness, is, essentially viewed, accidental knowledge; its degree and scope is essentially indifferent. That essential knowledge is essentially related to existence does not mean the above-mentioned identity which abstract thought postulates between thought and being; nor does it signify, objectively, that knowledge corresponds to something existent as its object. But it means that knowledge has a relationship to the knower, who is essentially an existing individual, and that for this reason all essential knowledge is essentially related to existence.”

    This position has the advantage of entirely avoiding the seemingly insoluble problem of properly articulating the appropriate relationship between one’s sensory data and its correspondence to things as they independently are. Instead, unlike Descartes, it begins with existence and moves from there. This move allows Kierkegaard to escape a sort of tritely pedantic type of knowledge and enter another kind of ethical knowledge that necessarily entails and prompts action. For Kierkegaard, “the goal of movement for an existing individual is to arrive at a decision, and to renew it.” In fact, “such knowledge has a telos beyond knowledge; it is meant to direct our lives.” This knowledge is not to be understood as simply another puzzle to be solved, arranged and systematized, but rather is to always root the individual in the irrefutable existence of the ethical.

    One could level the charge that Kierkegaard unfairly presumes the existence of the divine. However, this is to display a naivete concerning Kierkegaard’s intended audience. He is not interested in fabricating any sort a priori proof for god’s positive ontological existence. That would be once again going down the objective road. Now Kierkegaard’s claim concerning the special status of Christianity is one that is shrouded in doubt. In any case, if that is granted, it does not seem to allow Kierkegaard the ability to enter into any sort of epistemological dialogue with those of another faith. Although it must be said that this could quite possibly be a gross misunderstanding of Kierkegaard’s thought.

    Both Søren Kierkegaard and Saint Augustine provide an invaluable counterpoint to the predominantly prevailing modern approach to epistemology. Augustine points out that knowing is inexplicably intertwined with internal modes of knowing that cannot be reduced to access to universal exterior rules of knowing. Kierkegaard beautifully inverts our hierarchical relationship between the objective and subjective ways. Together they may not solve all of philosophy’s epistemological problems. However they undoubtedly make invaluable contributions to the proper framing of the questions begging to be asked.

Works Cited

Peter King, Metaphilosophy 29 (1998), 179–195

Ibid., p. 64

Revue des Etudes Augustiniennes, 35 (1989), 120-127

“Ethics and Persuasion: Keirkegaard’s Existential Dialectic,” The Modern Schoolman, XXXIII (1956), 218-239

Postscript., p 182

McDonald, William, "Søren Kierkegaard", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/kierkegaard/>.

Mendelson, Michael, "Saint Augustine", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/augustine/>.

Kierkegaard, Søren, and W. H. Auden. The Living Thoughts of Kierkegaard. New York: New York Review, 1999. Print.

Kierkegaard, Søren, Howard Vincent. Hong, and Edna Hatlestad. Hong. The Essential Kierkegaard. Princeton, N.J: Princeton UP, 2000. Print.

The Precision of acts

    The philosopher brave enough to strike out on new ground cannot be expected to be aware of all its relevant nuanced intricacies. Thus it is left to subsequent generations to work out not only what the objections and problems are but also how the pioneer himself would most likely respond. It is no different when it comes to the philosopher John Stuart Mill who has become synonymous with the moral theory of Utilitarianism. This paper will endeavor to show how Mill himself would most likely come out on the significant divide between Act and Rule. It is the contention of this paper that the orthodox interpretation maintaining an Act reading of Mill is both the most probable and consistent with the philosopher’s intention.

    In the pursuit of attempting to understand the relationship between the principle of utility and individual actions, Mill states the following: “All action is for the sake of some end, and rules of action, it seems natural to suppose, must take their whole character and color from the end to which they are subservient.” (2001) This would seem to strongly suggest that rules are properly understood as heuristic devices. They are important tools to be sure, but they are far from fixed. In fact, he states “to consider the rules of morality as improvable is one thing; to pass over the intermediate generalizations  entirely, and endeavor to test each individual action directly by the first principle, is another. It is a strange notion that the acknowledgement of a first principle is inconsistent with the admission of secondary ones.” (Mill 2001) Rules then, he admits, can be improved over time. However typically in most situations even an Act Utilitarian can admit that for purposes of expediency, rules are indispensable. Undeniably when an agent is evaluating the possible choices, secondary rules necessarily enter into the equation. Those rules however are being continuously reevaluated with new incoming data. Therefore rules would be evaluated on the basis that they are right in proportion as they continue to promote actions that tend to improve the general happiness. This theory “like other precepts of art, rest on middle principles or intermediate generalizations of science, in this case on causal laws from those parts of the deductive sciences of human nature and society which deal with the consequences of actions for happiness.” (Brown 1974)

    Rule Utilitarians may at this point object that far from rules simply entering in as a part of the equation of an agents moral calculus; they are instead more properly understood as the entire equation. Mill himself throughout his writing repeatedly assigned substantial importance to whether or not an action conformed with some secondary principle depending on the particular example. An agent standing before the act cannot possibly be expected to capably evaluate every particular action in accordance with the first principle. Only in retrospect is that truly possible. Furthermore, there are instances where one can argue that a secondary principle should be followed even though more immediate good could be caused by not following that rule.

    Obviously time in this case does admittedly matter. That is why Mill emphatically states “that there has been ample time, namely, the whole past duration of the human species. During all that time mankind have been learning by experience the tendencies of actions: on which experience all the prudence as well as all the morality of life are dependent.” (2001) On the second objection some clarification is needed. The only way in which any Utilitarian could justify following that rule is if by doing so he or she believed that in the long run fidelity to that rule would bring about a greater amount of good than any momentary advantages.  Mill stated in a letter to John Venn: 

 “I agree with you that the right way of testing actions by their consequences, is to test them by the natural consequences of the particular action, and not by those which would follow if everyone did the same. But, for the most part, the consideration of what would happen if every one did the same, is the only means we have of discovering the tendency. of the act in the particular case.”  (John Stuart Mill 1972)

    This passage seems to be quite definitive on the matter at hand. Mill is clearly endorsing the view that ideally actions are to be judged based on the actual as opposed to hypothetical consequences. However since this is not always possible rules must be leaned on as an indispensable guide. To further illustrate the malleability of secondary principles consider Mill’s treatment of lying.

 “Yet that even this rule, sacred as it is, admits of possible exceptions, is acknowledged by all       moralists: the chief of which is when the withholding of some fact (as of information from a malefactor, or of bad news from a person dangerously ill) would save an individual (especially an individual other than oneself) from the great and unmerited evil, and when the withholding can only be effected by denial. But in order that the exception may not extend itself beyond the need, and may have the least possible effect in weakening reliance on veracity, it ought to be recognized, and, if possible, its limits defined; and if the principle of utility is good for anything, it  must be good for weighing these conflicting utilities against one another, and marking out the region within which one or the other preponderates.” (Mill 2001)

    This illustrates the point that ultimately for Mill “actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.” (Mill 2001) There is nothing necessarily innately infallible in rules under this system because for Mill everything must defer to the first principle. He is clearly defining a Utilitarian as “those who stand up for the utility as the test of right and wrong.” (Mill 2001)

    This debate has inspired countless thinkers to speculate on the matter. It is fair to say that many gallons of ink have been spilled trying to resolve debate. However, it would seem from the issues raised here there are too many discrepancies for a purely Rule Utilitarian reading to be sufficiently consistent with what Mill intended in his seminal work Utilitarianism. An Act reading seems to render Mill’s theory far more coherent.

Bibliography

Brown, D. G. (1974). "Mill's Act-Utilitarianism " Philosophical Quarterly 24(94): 67-69.

 

John Stuart Mill, F. E. M., Dwight N. Lindley (1972). Later Letters of John Stuart Mill 1849-1873. Toronto Collected Works.

 

Mill, J. S. (2001). Utilitarianism Indianapolis/Cambridge, Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.

 

Values of the Second Amendment

The cry of the rights of the individual to protect oneself is an oft repeated mantra. So much so that the other side of the debate concerning the proper limits of personal freedoms has been woefully obscured in arguments of straw men, red herrings and ad hominem.

Much has been said about values, but many seem to be belaboring under the mistaken assumption that values are an all or nothing game. A mere precursory survey of ethics or legal jurisprudence will however, quickly reveal an intractably more complex equation. One of the more vexing realizations is that societal values often compete with one another.

 In this particular case, there is a tug-of-war between public safety and individual freedom. Of course, this is an age-old dichotomy that has taken innumerable forms throughout the years. Admittedly, many of these difficulties produce less than desirable choices and results.

 Often times, there simply is no perfect answer to such insoluble problems. Thus value judgements must be made. In the case of the second amendment, context is essential. The second amendment reads as follows: 

 “A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.”

Within jurisprudence it is important to understand the difference and relationship between principles of law and statutory laws as such. Principles are the source from which rules must draw their color and tone.

Fortunately the guiding principle for the second amendment is conveniently located within the text itself. The operative phrase is “necessary to the security of a free state.” This clearly indicates that laws regulating weapons should be orientated towards improving the security of the people. It is not a carte blanche.

 As many political philosophers have noted; entering into a societal contract necessarily means relinquishing certain freedoms enjoyed in the state of nature. This means that sometimes the needs of the many will be weighed against the wants of the few for the sake of societal cohesion.

In that spirit then the question of whether or not to allow concealed carry on college campuses must be framed in the context of what is best for the overall security. The focus must be comprehensive taking into account the unique circumstances that the college population presents. This conclusion stands in stark contrast to the pro-carry rhetoric that stresses personal security ad nauseum to the explicit exclusion of the needs of the many.