In the effort to do philosophy, one must be willing to examine and subsequently dismiss tacit assumptions and unarticulated presuppositions. In short, one must not cling to ordinary ways of thinking simply because they are familiar. Sir David Ross undoubtedly made significant and lasting contributions to the philosophy of ethics. However, in his attempt to defeat the theory of Utilitarianism, his attachment to the familiar unavoidably bleeds through. Therefore, it is the contention of this paper that his attack on what he deems as ‘Ideal Utilitarianism’ ultimately falls short.
The best definition of Ideal Utilitarianism, according to Ross, is provided by Professor Moore. “What makes actions right is that they are productive of more good than could have been produced by any other action open to the agent.”[1] (pg.16) Ross states his primary objection in the following manner:
“The essential defect of the 'ideal utilitarian* theory is that it ignores, or at least does not do full justice to, the highly personal character of duty. If the only duty is to produce the maximum of good, the question who is to have the good—• whether it is myself, or my benefactor, or a person to whom I have made a promise to confer that good on him, or a mere fellow man to whom I stand in no such special relation— should make no difference to my having a duty to produce that good. But we are all in fact sure that it makes a vast difference.” [1] (pg. 22)
The problem, however, is that the only justification provided here is the unsupported assertion, “we are all in fact sure that it makes a vast difference.” This is a clear example of the logical fallacy known as Argumentum ad populum. It matters not that all believe two plus two equals four. In a proof, one is required to demonstrate logically why the conclusion naturally follows from the premises. Further, it should be pointed out that the theory of utilitarianism is primarily prescriptive in nature. In other words, it is not seeking to describe how most people normally go about navigating ethical decisions. Instead, it seeks to establish a system to determine or define what it means to call an act right or wrong. It therefore does no good for Ross to criticize Ideal Utilitarianism on the basis that it does not correspond to the way in which most people think about the process of making ethical decisions.
Ross seems to be particularly interested in the ethics involved in the complexities of human relations. He stresses the importance of these relationships so much so that he makes the following charge:
“In fact the theory of ideal utilitarianism*...seems to simplify unduly our relations to our fellows. It says, in effect, that the only morally significant relation in which my neighbors stand to me is that of being possible beneficiaries by my action.” [1] (pg. 19)
This charge however is guilty of attacking a straw man. An adherent to the theory of Utilitarianism would be entirely consistent in responding that these relationships are of course morally significant insofar as they enter into determining what action available to the agent would bring about the greatest amount of good. One could even go so far as to say that these relationships, far from being reduced to irrelevancy, are in point of fact part of the basis from which an agent goes about ascertaining how to produce the greatest good.
A further problem with Ross’s argument is that he leaves open too much room for equivocation concerning what exactly he means by Ideal Utilitarianism. One cannot but help to ask whether he is referring to Act or Rule Utilitarianism. Consider the following quote:
“it must be maintained that there is a difference between prima facie duty and actual or absolute duty. When we think ourselves justified in breaking, and indeed morally obliged to break, a promise in order to relieve some one's distress, we do not for a moment cease to recognize a prima facie duty to keep our promise, and this leads us to feel, not indeed shame or repentance, but certainly compunction, for behaving as we do.” [1] (pg. 28)
From this alone one could be led to believe that Ross is secretly an Act Utilitarian; these prima facie duties could be viewed as rules. Thus when they conflict and an agent must choose between them, it is natural to feel compunction for violating one of them. However an Act Utilitarian would ultimately refer to the first principle in such cases of secondary conflict. This confusion is not without merit especially considering what Ross states concerning the duty to produce the good.
“besides the three (comparatively) simple goods, virtue, knowledge, and pleasure, there is a more complex good, not reducible to these, consisting in the proportionment of happiness to virtue. The bringing of this about is a duty which we owe to all men alike...This, therefore, with beneficence and self-improvement, comes under the general principle that we should produce as much good as possible.” [1] (pg. 27)
It is unlikely that a utilitarian would necessarily object per se, to the assertion that the greatest good is complex and irreducible to any one simple good. If Ross wishes to attack Ideal Utilitarianism it requires him to somehow rebut the idea that the right action is the one which produces the greatest amount of good in the world.
While there may indeed be legitimate grounds for concern regarding the theory of Ideal Utilitarianism, the arguments presented by Ross fail to convince the skeptical mind. One must not resort to sophistry when endeavoring to conduct proper philosophical examination. This in no way invalidates the many excellent ideas raised by the venerable Sir David Ross. As previously stated, “The Right And The Good” has made what have proven to be significant and lasting contributions to ongoing ethical dialogues.
Bibliography
1. Ross, D., The Right and The Good ed. P. Stratton-Lake1877: Oxford University Press.
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