The philosopher brave enough to strike out on new ground cannot be expected to be aware of all its relevant nuanced intricacies. Thus it is left to subsequent generations to work out not only what the objections and problems are but also how the pioneer himself would most likely respond. It is no different when it comes to the philosopher John Stuart Mill who has become synonymous with the moral theory of Utilitarianism. This paper will endeavor to show how Mill himself would most likely come out on the significant divide between Act and Rule. It is the contention of this paper that the orthodox interpretation maintaining an Act reading of Mill is both the most probable and consistent with the philosopher’s intention.
In the pursuit of attempting to understand the relationship between the principle of utility and individual actions, Mill states the following: “All action is for the sake of some end, and rules of action, it seems natural to suppose, must take their whole character and color from the end to which they are subservient.” (2001) This would seem to strongly suggest that rules are properly understood as heuristic devices. They are important tools to be sure, but they are far from fixed. In fact, he states “to consider the rules of morality as improvable is one thing; to pass over the intermediate generalizations entirely, and endeavor to test each individual action directly by the first principle, is another. It is a strange notion that the acknowledgement of a first principle is inconsistent with the admission of secondary ones.” (Mill 2001) Rules then, he admits, can be improved over time. However typically in most situations even an Act Utilitarian can admit that for purposes of expediency, rules are indispensable. Undeniably when an agent is evaluating the possible choices, secondary rules necessarily enter into the equation. Those rules however are being continuously reevaluated with new incoming data. Therefore rules would be evaluated on the basis that they are right in proportion as they continue to promote actions that tend to improve the general happiness. This theory “like other precepts of art, rest on middle principles or intermediate generalizations of science, in this case on causal laws from those parts of the deductive sciences of human nature and society which deal with the consequences of actions for happiness.” (Brown 1974)
Rule Utilitarians may at this point object that far from rules simply entering in as a part of the equation of an agents moral calculus; they are instead more properly understood as the entire equation. Mill himself throughout his writing repeatedly assigned substantial importance to whether or not an action conformed with some secondary principle depending on the particular example. An agent standing before the act cannot possibly be expected to capably evaluate every particular action in accordance with the first principle. Only in retrospect is that truly possible. Furthermore, there are instances where one can argue that a secondary principle should be followed even though more immediate good could be caused by not following that rule.
Obviously time in this case does admittedly matter. That is why Mill emphatically states “that there has been ample time, namely, the whole past duration of the human species. During all that time mankind have been learning by experience the tendencies of actions: on which experience all the prudence as well as all the morality of life are dependent.” (2001) On the second objection some clarification is needed. The only way in which any Utilitarian could justify following that rule is if by doing so he or she believed that in the long run fidelity to that rule would bring about a greater amount of good than any momentary advantages. Mill stated in a letter to John Venn:
“I agree with you that the right way of testing actions by their consequences, is to test them by the natural consequences of the particular action, and not by those which would follow if everyone did the same. But, for the most part, the consideration of what would happen if every one did the same, is the only means we have of discovering the tendency. of the act in the particular case.” (John Stuart Mill 1972)
This passage seems to be quite definitive on the matter at hand. Mill is clearly endorsing the view that ideally actions are to be judged based on the actual as opposed to hypothetical consequences. However since this is not always possible rules must be leaned on as an indispensable guide. To further illustrate the malleability of secondary principles consider Mill’s treatment of lying.
“Yet that even this rule, sacred as it is, admits of possible exceptions, is acknowledged by all moralists: the chief of which is when the withholding of some fact (as of information from a malefactor, or of bad news from a person dangerously ill) would save an individual (especially an individual other than oneself) from the great and unmerited evil, and when the withholding can only be effected by denial. But in order that the exception may not extend itself beyond the need, and may have the least possible effect in weakening reliance on veracity, it ought to be recognized, and, if possible, its limits defined; and if the principle of utility is good for anything, it must be good for weighing these conflicting utilities against one another, and marking out the region within which one or the other preponderates.” (Mill 2001)
This illustrates the point that ultimately for Mill “actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.” (Mill 2001) There is nothing necessarily innately infallible in rules under this system because for Mill everything must defer to the first principle. He is clearly defining a Utilitarian as “those who stand up for the utility as the test of right and wrong.” (Mill 2001)
This debate has inspired countless thinkers to speculate on the matter. It is fair to say that many gallons of ink have been spilled trying to resolve debate. However, it would seem from the issues raised here there are too many discrepancies for a purely Rule Utilitarian reading to be sufficiently consistent with what Mill intended in his seminal work Utilitarianism. An Act reading seems to render Mill’s theory far more coherent.
Bibliography
Brown, D. G. (1974). "Mill's Act-Utilitarianism " Philosophical Quarterly 24(94): 67-69.
John Stuart Mill, F. E. M., Dwight N. Lindley (1972). Later Letters of John Stuart Mill 1849-1873. Toronto Collected Works.
Mill, J. S. (2001). Utilitarianism Indianapolis/Cambridge, Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.
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