When contemplating and discussing the intricately complex philosophical branch of epistemology, one can easily become overwhelmed. It is laden with myriads of apparent contradictions and insoluble paradoxes. Oftentimes, to borrow a cliché, it is far too easy to become lost in the trees losing sight of the forest. It is the contention of this paper that with the aide of Saint Augustine and Søren Kierkegaard, epistemological investigation can be reframed in such a way that avoids many of the errors inherent in the modern project. This paper will further evaluate the strengths and respective weaknesses of these two thinkers’ epistemology. Hopefully by the end of this paper the quest towards properly framing the enterprise of epistemology will be less obscure.
Much of the business of philosophy is occupied with properly defining the question. Without this first step, an infinite production of useless answers will be generated in response to the question that was never asked in the first place. This is where Saint Augustine’s brilliance is to be located within the De magistro. Here the question is explicitly framed in terms of knowing as an inherently private affair consisting of inner episodes of awareness. This is contradistinguished from the Wittgenstein picture of knowing as a process of rule-governed behavior, accompanied by the understanding of those rules being intrinsically public. The danger of abstractions is that they tend to quickly lead to meaningless obscurity divorced from concrete examples. In that vein consider the following borrowed example:
“You rehearse to yourself the steps of a mathematical proof in an effort to understand it, but not yet grasping it: you’re merely parroting the proof. While thinking it through, however, you suddenly have a flash of insight and see how the proof works—you understand it and thereby recognize its truth.”
This example perfectly highlights the familiar phenomenological process that St. Augustine refers to as “illumination.” The denial of the significance of this moment is the Achilles heel to much of the modern epistemological approach. It seems to confirm what is instinctively known to be the case, which is that the act of knowing is an inescapably inner undertaking.
Without overly rehashing and restating the arguments, a certain amount of review seems to be in order. Much of the De magistro is devoted to successfully refuting what is commonly referred to as the ‘information-transference account’ (hereafter referred to as ITA). In quickly summarizing, this is due to the fact that the language or sign exit transition is never truly accomplished. Instead it seems that signs are indomitably circular in a paradigmatic sense. It should be made clear what St. Augustine is not asking, namely, the nature of the relationship between knowledge and the physical world vis-à-vis sensory data. Rather, he is interested in the sort of platonic knowledge of the eternal forms. More specifically the human ability of teaching or knowledge transference is what is being properly put under the proverbial microscope. St. Augustine rightfully concludes that insofar as humans can teach, it seems to be a sort of Socratic prompting through the pointing out of signs. This however thus far leaves one at the same problem dealt with by Plato in The Meno. For various reasons St. Augustine rejects the solution of recollection. Instead he offers a uniquely Christian positive solution.
Saint Augustine is at his strongest when properly delineating the problem at hand. However, when the mode is switched from the razor sharp deconstruction of inadequate answers to the positive construction of explanatory responses, clarity suffers. Essentially, the reader is asked to accept the idea that by virtue of mere antecedent belief in the ontological existence of a supremely benevolent divine being, humankind is endowed with access to the eternal Truth. Supposedly this god has instilled within all of mankind the internal light which renders St. Augustine’s theory of signs to be a valid epistemological approach. The obvious problem with this solution is that it is exclusively available to those who already hold that belief antecedent to reason in order to justify the reasonableness of any and all truth claims. It would seem that any epistemological approach purportedly defending the supremacy of reason should not use unsubstantiated belief as an integral, primal ingredient. Furthermore, the criticism could be fairly pointed out that this is a solution that works all too well. Whenever one encounters a difficult problem, one can simply invoke the existence of god as a way to effortlessly fill in the gaps. This response tends to have the effect of terminating further investigation due to the fact that nearly anything can be simply explained away via asserting the role of the divine.
In turning to Søren Kierkegaard, it should be stated at the outset that, due to the intentional fragmentary nature of his writing, any explication and subsequent explanation of his work is consummately suspect. The consistent theme across his writing is a virulent reaction to the modern project perfectly personified in Hegel. Within this umbrella certain relationships are defined and explored as central to his attack on the so called “system.” The first is the fascinating hierarchical reversal of the relationship between the objective and subjective ways of knowledge. Seemingly implicit within for laymen and within philosophical discussions of knowledge the objective way is generally regarded as inherently superior. Kierkegaard however claims that this is ill-conceived. This interchange begins with an examination of what exactly objective knowledge consists of. Abstractions from the subjective experience are the raw material from which the objective is composed. The more one abstracts, the more objective one becomes. However, the more one abstracts, the further one becomes from the centrality of the phenomenological experience that is the locus and reality of the human experience. This process inevitably renders the subject as accidental. The objective way is, by very definition, coldly and irreconcilably indifferent to the subject. In contrast to many of his contemporaries, Kierkegaard is interested in a radically different epistemological relationship. Much of the present philosophical work being conducted around him was preoccupied with the relationship between knowledge and the object of that knowledge. Kierkegaard however seeks to examine the relationship between knowledge and the actual knower. This inquiry has the possibility of crumbling the perceived possibility of being able to cognitively separate oneself from the question of god’s existence. The following quote summarizes and elaborates on this point in the Great Dane’s own words:
“All essential knowledge relates to existence, or only such knowledge as has an essential relationship to existence is essential knowledge. All knowledge which does not inwardly relate itself to existence in the reflection of inwardness, is, essentially viewed, accidental knowledge; its degree and scope is essentially indifferent. That essential knowledge is essentially related to existence does not mean the above-mentioned identity which abstract thought postulates between thought and being; nor does it signify, objectively, that knowledge corresponds to something existent as its object. But it means that knowledge has a relationship to the knower, who is essentially an existing individual, and that for this reason all essential knowledge is essentially related to existence.”
This position has the advantage of entirely avoiding the seemingly insoluble problem of properly articulating the appropriate relationship between one’s sensory data and its correspondence to things as they independently are. Instead, unlike Descartes, it begins with existence and moves from there. This move allows Kierkegaard to escape a sort of tritely pedantic type of knowledge and enter another kind of ethical knowledge that necessarily entails and prompts action. For Kierkegaard, “the goal of movement for an existing individual is to arrive at a decision, and to renew it.” In fact, “such knowledge has a telos beyond knowledge; it is meant to direct our lives.” This knowledge is not to be understood as simply another puzzle to be solved, arranged and systematized, but rather is to always root the individual in the irrefutable existence of the ethical.
One could level the charge that Kierkegaard unfairly presumes the existence of the divine. However, this is to display a naivete concerning Kierkegaard’s intended audience. He is not interested in fabricating any sort a priori proof for god’s positive ontological existence. That would be once again going down the objective road. Now Kierkegaard’s claim concerning the special status of Christianity is one that is shrouded in doubt. In any case, if that is granted, it does not seem to allow Kierkegaard the ability to enter into any sort of epistemological dialogue with those of another faith. Although it must be said that this could quite possibly be a gross misunderstanding of Kierkegaard’s thought.
Both Søren Kierkegaard and Saint Augustine provide an invaluable counterpoint to the predominantly prevailing modern approach to epistemology. Augustine points out that knowing is inexplicably intertwined with internal modes of knowing that cannot be reduced to access to universal exterior rules of knowing. Kierkegaard beautifully inverts our hierarchical relationship between the objective and subjective ways. Together they may not solve all of philosophy’s epistemological problems. However they undoubtedly make invaluable contributions to the proper framing of the questions begging to be asked.
Works Cited
Peter King, Metaphilosophy 29 (1998), 179–195
Ibid., p. 64
Revue des Etudes Augustiniennes, 35 (1989), 120-127
“Ethics and Persuasion: Keirkegaard’s Existential Dialectic,” The Modern Schoolman, XXXIII (1956), 218-239
Postscript., p 182
McDonald, William, "Søren Kierkegaard", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/kierkegaard/>.
Mendelson, Michael, "Saint Augustine", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/augustine/>.
Kierkegaard, Søren, and W. H. Auden. The Living Thoughts of Kierkegaard. New York: New York Review, 1999. Print.
Kierkegaard, Søren, Howard Vincent. Hong, and Edna Hatlestad. Hong. The Essential Kierkegaard. Princeton, N.J: Princeton UP, 2000. Print.

